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McCall James
THE PAST AS PROLOGUE: A HISTORY
OF THE RIGHT TO REPOSSESS
JAMEs R. MCCALL*
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.1 the United States Supreme
Court held that Wisconsin's pre-judgment wage garnishment proce-
dure violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Mr. Justice Black, in a vigorous dissenting opinion, remarked ap-
provingly on the opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the
case at bar:
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin properly pointed out:
"The ability to place a lien upon a man's property such as to
temporarily deprive him of its beneficial use, without any judicial
determination of probable cause, dates back not only to medieval
England, but also to Roman times." [citations omitted]
The State Supreme Court then went on to point out a statement
made by Mr. Justice Holmes in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co. [cita-
tions omitted]:
"The Fourteenth Amendment, itself a historical product, did
not destroy history for the States and substitute mechanical com-
partments of law all exactly alike. If a thing has been practiced
for 200 years by common consent, it will need a strong case for
the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it, as is well illustrated by
Owenbey v. Morgan [citations omitted]. 2
The majority opinion in Sniadach did not respond to the historical
argument made by Mr. Justice Black.
The rationale of the Sniadach decision has subsequently been
examined and extended by various courts in many creditors' rights
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law, San Francisco, California; B.A. 1958, Pomona College; J.D. 1962, Harvard
Law School.
1. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2. Id. at 349.
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contexts." Adams v. Egley4 represents one important recent applica-
tion. In that case a United States District Court held that California
Commercial Code sections 9503 and 9504,6 which piovide for self-
3. Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972), numerous state and federal courts had passed upon the validity
of various forms of governmentally executed pre-judgment remedies, such as replevin,
claim and delivery, and detinue. These decisions were divided. Cases holding that the
Sniadach rationale invalidated such pre-judgment remedies include: Reeves v. Motor
Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp.
284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.
N.Y. 1970); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Randone v. Appellate
Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.
3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel
Serv., Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970); Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d
712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969). Other courts took a more restricted view of the Sniadach
decision and held such pre-judgment remedies to be constitutional: Brunswick Corp. v.
J. & P., Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick,
323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); Wheeler v. Adams Co., 322 F. Supp. 645 (D. Md.
1971); Almor Furniture & Appliances, Inc. v. MacMillan, 116 N.J. Super. 65, 280 A.2d
862 (1971). In Fuentes, the Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether Sniadach
invalidated all such pre-judgment court-officer-administered remedies, where no pre-
seizure hearing was provided, in the affirmative. The Fuentes Court held that a debtor's
waiver of her right to object to repossession was invalid where the contract language did
not specifically provide that the debtor had waived her right to a pre-seizure hearing of
some kind. A waiver of such a right to pre-seizure hearing was held valid by the Su-
preme Court a few months prior to Fuentes in a situation where the waiver provision was
contained in a negotiated contract and was "voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly"
made. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972). The question of
whether "state action," which was clearly present in all the cases mentioned in this
footnote, is required before the Sniadach rationale can be applied, has been raised not
only in Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), but also in a number of
other cases, including those listed in note 6 infra.
4. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
5. CAL. CoM. CODE §§ 9503-04 (West 1964). The California and UCC ver-
sions of these sections read as follows:
§ 9503:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may pro-
ceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the
peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the
secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it
available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured
party which is reasonably convenient to both parties. Without removal a
secured party may render equipment unusable, and may dispose of collateral
on the debtor's premises under Section 9504.
§ 9504:
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose
of any or all of the collateral in its then condition or following any com-
mercially reasonable preparation or processing. Any sale of goods is sub-
ject to the division on sales (Division 2). The proceeds of disposition shall
be applied in the order following to
(a) The reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale,
selling and the like and, to the extent provided for in the agreement and
not prohibited by law, the reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses in-
curred by the secured party;
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help seizure and sale of collateral by a secured party upon default by a
debtor and which are identical to Uniform Commercial Code sections
9-503 and 9-504, were unconstitutional under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
(b) The satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security interest
under which the disposition is made;(c) The satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate se-
curity interest in the collateral if written notification of demand therefor is
received before distribution of the proceeds is completed. If requested by
the secured party, the holder of a subordinate security interest must season-
ably furnish reasonable proof of his interest, and unless he does so, the
secured party need not comply with his demand.(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party
must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed,
the debtor is liable for any deficiency. But if the underlying transaction
was a sale of accounts, contract rights, or chattel paper, the debtor is en-
titled to any surplus or is liable for any deficiency only if the security
agreement so provides.
(3) A sale or lease of collateral may be as a unit or in parcels, at
wholesale or retail and at any time and place and on any terms, provided
the secured party acts in good faith and in a commercially reasonable
manner. Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in
value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, the secured
party must give to the debtor, and to any other person who has a security
interest in the collateral and who has filed with the secured party a written
request for notice giving his address, a notice in writing of the time and
place of any public sale or of the time on or after which any private sale or
other intended disposition is to be made. Such notice must be delivered
personally or be deposited in the United States mail postage prepaid ad-
dressed to the debtor at his address as set forth in the financing statement
or as set forth in the security agreement or at such other address as may
have been furnished to the secured party in writing for this purpose, or, if
no address has been so set forth or furnished, at his last known address, and
to any other secured party at the address set forth in his request for notice,
at least five days before the date fixed for any public sale or before the
day on or after which any private sale or other disposition is to be made.
Notice of the time and place of a public sale shall also be given at least five
days before the date of sale by publication once in a newspaper of general
circulation published in the county in which the sale is to be held. Any
public sale shall be held in the county or place specified in the security
agreement, or if no county or place is specified in the security agreement,
in the county in which the collateral or any part thereof is located or in
the county in which the debtor has his residence or chief place of business,
or in the county in which the secured party has his residence or a place of
business if the debtor does not have a residence or chief place of
business within this State. If the collateral is located outside of this State
or has been removed from this State, a public sale may be held in the local-
ity in which the collateral is located. Any public sale may be post-
poned from time to time by public announcement at the time and place last
scheduled for the sale. The secured party may buy at any public sale and
if the collateral is customarily sold in a recognized market or is the subject
of widely or regularly distributed standard price quotations he may buy at
private sale. Any sale of which notice is delivered or mailed and published
as herein provided and which is held as herein provided is a public sale.(4) When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default,
the disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights
therein, discharges the security interest under which it is made and any secur-
ity interest or lien subordinate thereto. The purchaser takes free of all such
rights and interest even though the secured party fails to comply with the
requirements of this chapter or of any judicial proceedings(a) In the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowledge
of any defects in the sale and if he does not buy in collusion with the se-
cured party, other bidders or the person conducting the sale; or
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From the moment that the Sniadach decision was xendered, it was
clear that the constitutionality of self-help remedies available to lend-
ers of money and credit sellers eventually would be placed at issue.
Indeed, as of this writing, a number of other federal and state courts
have spoken on the issue.' Considering the crucial role played by
chattel security and related self-help remedies in the credit structure of
the country, a definitive answer from the Supreme Court on the con-
stitutional question is required in the near future.'
In resolving the constitutional issue, it is likely that the historical
bases of self-help remedies will be examined.8 Such remedies with
(b) In any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith.
(5) A person who is liable to a secured party under a guaranty, in-
dorsement, repurchase agreement or the like and who receives a transfer of
collateral from the secured party or is subrogated to his rights has there-
after the rights and duties of the secured party. Such a transfer of col-
lateral is not a sale or disposition of the collateral under this division.
6. A number of cases have held that self-help repossession pursuant to UCC
§§ 9-503 and 9-504 is constitutional, either on the basis that state action was not in-
volved or that the debtor had given a valid waiver in a conditional sale contract.
See, e.g., Colvin v. Avco Fin. Serv., CCH SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE 52,046
(D. Utah 1973); Greene v. First Nat'l Exchange Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va.
1972); Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1972). At least one other decision has reached the same result as the Adams
decision mentioned in. the text: Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Dinitz, CCH SECURED
TRhANSACTIONS GUIDE 52,007 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972).
7. Since none of the cases mentioned in note 6 supra have, as yet, reached
the appellate court level, it appears likely that the first circuit court decision on the
issue will be rendered in the Adams case. It also appears probable that, regardless of
the outcome of that decision, a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court
will be requested.
8. The history of various legal rights and remedies has often been considered of
great import in the Court's constitutional determinations. In Jackman v. Rosenbaum
Co., 260 U.S. 22 (1922), the Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute which gave a prop-
erty owner the right to build a party wall adjoining and encroaching upon a neigh-
bor's property. It held there was no violation of the fourteenth amendment, as "...
the custom of party walls was introduced by the first settlers in Philadelphia . . . and
has prevailed in the State ever since." Id. at 30.
The quotation from Jackman has been cited with approval in a large number of
cases. See, e.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 370 (1959) (upholding a Maryland
health statute allowing inspection of a private dwelling where a homeowner was con-
victed under the statute for resisting inspection without a warrant); First Nat'l Benevo-
lent Soc'y v. Garrison, 58 F. Supp. 972, 983 (S.D. Cal. 1945) (establishing that a state
may regulate the interstate sale of insurance to its residents until or unless pre-empted
by Congress); Coler v. Corn Exchange Bank, 250 N.Y. 136, 142, 164 N.E. 882, 884
(1928), ajfd, 280 U.S. 218 (1930) (upholding a New York statute allowing city official
to seize the property of an absconding husband or father, without notice, and apply
same to maintenance of his family).
Other recent examples of the Tackman premise include Wheeler v. Adams Co.,
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respect to collateral were known and authorized in antiquity, and
appear to have been a feature of the English common law for cen-
turies, continuing to be recognized by English courts even during pe-
riods when the validity of nonpossessory security interest against
claims of third parties was denied. Subject during this history only to
such niceties as the equity of redemption and, in modem times, a pro-
hibition against breaching the peace, the self-help remedies of a holder
of a nonpossessory security interest in chattels is at least as time-hon-
ored as the right to a pre-judgment lien noted by Mr. Justice Black in
Sniadach. The historical antecedents of the right to repossess em-
bodied in section 9503 are, as this Article will point out, quite exten-
sive.9
322 F. Supp. 645, 658 n.2 (D. Md. 1971) (the court, citing the dictum of Mr. Justice
Holmes in Jackman, held that the replevin procedure did not violate the United States
Constitution's prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure or its requirements
of procedural due process) and Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (when
plaintiff challenged the granting of property tax exemptions to religious organizations
for properties used solely for religious worship, the Court stated that "an unbroken
practice of according exemption to churches, openly and by affirmative state action,
not covertly or by state inaction, is not something to be lightly cast aside" and held
there was no violation of the religion clauses of the first amendment).
Other cases citing Jackman for the premise that historical longevity of a prac-
tice challenged under the due process clause is an important factor for consideration
include: McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 203 (1970); Anderson Nat'l Bank
v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 244 (1943); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 605 (5th
Cir. 1960) (dissent); Harris v. Anderson, 194 Kan. 302, 326, 400 P.2d 24, 43 (1965);
Murray v. Comptroller, 241 Md. 383, 400, 216 A.2d 897, 907 (1966); Slansky v. State,
192 Md. 94, 106, 63 A.2d 599, 604 (1949); Lincoln v. Page, 109 N.H. 30, 31, 241
A.2d 799, 800 (1968); Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie, 296 N.Y. 374, 393,
73 N.E.2d 705, 714 (1947); La Flamme v. Milne, 127 Vt. 301, 302, 248 A.2d 692,
693 (1968); Family Finance Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 172, 154 N.W.2d 259,
264 (1967), rev'd, 395 U.S. 337 (1969). But see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972).
For a statement questioning the Jackman premise in general terms, see Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 386 (1970) (commenting that there is no
such thing as "automatic adoption" of an English rule; rather "only that portion ap-
plicable to... [the American] situation.")
The significance of historical treatment by the courts of replevin procedures is
highlighted in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). In that case the Court over-
turned the replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania on the grounds that allowing
pre-judgment seizures without giving the debtor an opportunity to be heard violated his
procedural due process rights. The Court carefully distinguished the procedure under
the statute from the historical common law replevin actions. It found that while pre-
judgment seizure was allowed by the common law, there was nevertheless notice and
opportunity to be heard given to the debtor. In addition, a state official made at
least a summary determination of the rights of the parties before seizure from one of
them.
9. Section 9503 does not use the word "repossess" but speaks of "... the
right to take possession of the collateral." In Adams v. Egley it is clear that in at
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I. GREEK AND ROMAN LAW: SELF-HELP
AND REPOSSESSION
During the classical period of Athenian history the Greek legal system
generally regarded private self-help with benevolence. The state did
not attempt to enforce the judgments of its courts; rather, a person
obtaining a judgment in a private lawsuit was expected to exercise self-
help to enforce it.' ° A judgment debtor who resisted a creditor's at-
tempts to seize chattels to satisfy a judgment was treated as a public
offender and subjected to a monetary fine equal to the value of the
property which the holdef of the judgment was seeking to recover.
The disabilities which attached to the status of being a debtor of the
state could be escaped by the resisting judgment debtor only when he
satisfied both the private holder of the judgment and the state for
the amount of the fine." A judgment creditor, or any other per-
son having the right to use self-help under the law of Athens, was le-
gally entitled to exercise that right aggressively, even to the point of
breaching the peace and causing physical injury to the debtor.' 2
There were three basic forms of security devices in the Greek le-
gal system during the classical period-pledge, hypothec, and sale sub-
ject to redemption by the debtor.' 3 The ancient Greek pledge was
similar to the familiar common law device of the same name and con-
sisted of a transfer of physical possession and title of the collateral
by the debtor to the creditor, with the latter being required to restore
possession of the property to the debtor upon discharge of the debt.'4
Under the hypothee device, the property remained in the debtor's
possession and ownership, but the creditor had the right to take pos-
session of the property from the debtor upon default of the debt.' 5
The sale subject to redemption resembled the early form of English
least one of the cases there was a loan of money unconnected with the sale of chattel
so that the taking of possession by the secured party in that case did not, technically,
amount to a "repossession." However, this is far from a significant point since the
general public as well as the bar understand that "repossession" is most often
used in a general sense to denote a creditor's self-help seizure of his chattel security
upon default.
10. L. WHmBLEY, A COMPANION TO GREEK STUDMS 489-90 (3d ed. 1916).
11. Id.
12. F. PRiNGsHEim, THE GREEK IAW OF SALE 286-87 (1950) [hereinafter cited
as PRINGSnEIM].
13. A. HARIuSoN, THE LAw oF ATHENS 258 (1968) [hereinafter cited as HARRI-
SON].
14. Id.
15. J. JONES, THE LAw Am) LEGAL TEORY OF THE GREEKS 238 (1956) [herein-
after cited as JONES].
1973]
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bill of sale and American chattel mortgage, and was the earliest and
most common method of chattel security for the repayment of money
in Greek society. 16 A transaction in which this device was used re-
quired a transfer (by "sale") of ownership of the collateral to the
creditor, subject to the debtor's right to reacquire ownership of the
property upon payment of the debt. Possession was at all times re-
tained by the debtor, with the creditor having the right to seize posses-
sion by self-help upon default in payment of the secured debt."1 Thus,
both hypothec and sale subject to redemption established valid non-
possessory security interests in a creditor who was allowed, upon de-
fault, to take possession of the mortgaged property by self-help, even
of an aggressive nature.' 8  After repossession of the property pursuant
to either security device, the creditor was treated as the owner of the
collateral; no formal procedure was required to terminate the debt-
or's interest in the property. If the creditor sold the property, he was
not required to turn over to the debtor any funds received from the
sale, even if that sale had produced a surplus over and above the re-
maining amount of the defaulted obligation.19
In the early development of the Greek law of sale there was no
method available for creating a binding contractual obligation to pay
for goods sold on credit.20  Thus it was common practice for a credit
seller to retain title to the property until the full purchase price had
been paid, and this "security interest" was readily enforceable by a right
to retake on the part of the seller-owner upon default.2' The seller's
right to retain title made it advisable for the buyer to include in a credit
sales contract a provision giving him the right to seize the goods from
the seller upon payment of all installments in those situations in which
the seller retained possession as well as title during the period of pay-
ment.22
A study of the early Roman legal system discloses many similari-
ties to the Greek law of chattel security. For example, the tolerance of
self-help remedies was clearly established and a creditor had the right
16. Id. at 237.
17. HARIUsoN, supra note 13, at 258.
18. HARRISON, supra note 13, at 258-72, 282-83; IoNns, supra note 15, at 237-38;
Wigmore, The Pledge-Idea: A Study in Comparative Legal Ideas 111, 11 HAv. L.
Rav. 18, 19 (1897) [hereinafter cited as Wigmorel.
19. See HAIsoN, supra note 13, at 280; JoNES, supra note 15, at 241; Wigmore,
supra note 18, at 19.
20. PRINGSHEIM, supra note 12, at 157.
21. Id. at 170, 244, 318-19.
22. Id. at 286 et seq.
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to seize the person of a debtor without court action upon a default
in payment.23 After the development of Roman classical law chattel
security was available to creditors in three principal forms: pignus,
which was similar to the Greek pledge device and involved the trans-
fer of possession to the creditor;24 hypothec, which was identical to the
Greek device of the same name; 25 and fiducia cum creditore, in which
title, but not possession of the collateral, was transferred to the credi-
tor as security for the payment of the debt.26 Both of the non-posses-
sory devices, hypothec and fiducia cum creditore, were used inter-
changeably to establish security interests in both movables and im-
movables.2 7  Fiducia cum creditore survived as a fiduciary device
throughout the classical period, but was severely restricted by reforms
in the Roman legal system during the fourth century and was vir-
tually nonexistent by the time of Justinian.28
In both hypothec and, during the period of its use, fiducia cum
creditore, the creditor could repossess the collateral upon default
in the payment of the underlying obligation and, if necessary, could
institute a legal proceeding to obtain possession of the collateral.20
The following statement of a 19th century commentator, regarding
Roman chattel security law, describes the right to repossess:
In the Roman law, if the debt was not paid at the time ap-
pointed, the creditor had the right to sell the property without the
authority or intervention of a court of justice, provided he duly
complied with the following conditions. If the contract of hypo-
thecation gave him an express authority to take possession of the
hypothecated property and appropriate it to his use in case of
debtor's default, he might at once seize and sell it. If no such
power was given him, he was bound to give notice to the debtor
of his intention to sell two years before any sale could take place
23. W. BucKLAND, A MANuAL OF RomAN PRIVATE LAw 352 (1939) [hereinafter
cited as BUCKLAND].
24. Id. at 352-53. See also W. BUCKLAND & A. McNAm, ROMAN LAW AND COM-
MON LAw 315 (1965) [hereinafter cited as BUcKLAND & McNAM].
25. W. BUcKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF RoMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JusTniN
475 (2d ed. 1932); BUcKLAND & McNAM, supra note 24, at 314.
26. BucKLAND, supra note 23, at 353.
27. Chaplin, The Story of Mortgage Law, 4 HARv. L. REv. 1, 5 (1890); Wig-
more, supra note 18, at 22-23.
28. BucKLAND & McNAiR, supra note 24, at 314-17; COOPER, TAE INSMfrUTE[S]
OF JusTNIAN, 330 (3d ed. 1852). (The Institutes of rustinian contained mention of
pignus and hypothec, but no mention of fiducia cum creditore.)
29. BucKLAND, supra note 23, at 353-54; BucKLAND & McNAm, supra note 24,
at 252-54.
1973]
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and the debtor had during all that time the power of redeeming
the charge.30
In early Roman law the debtor had no equity of redemption after
the creditor had taken possession upon default by exercise of his
rights under the device of fiducia cum creditore3 1 The creditor who
used the fiducia device was, however, required to deliver to the buyer
any surplus over the amount of the defaulted obligation which he
received as a result of a sale of the collateral.3 2 As indicated by the
quotation above, a Roman creditor using a hypothec security device was
well advised to insert a power of sale authorization in the security
documents in order to avoid the two-year redemption period, and such
a creditor was also accountable to the debtor for any surplus received
from the sale of the collateral after taking possession.8s As a result
of reforms in the Roman legal system during the fourth century,
restrictions such as the two-year redemption period were placed on the
hypothec creditor's right to dispose of property after taking posses-
sion and, as previously mentioned, fiducia cum creditore disappeared
as a security device. 4
The rights of a conditional seller with regard to self-help reme-
dies were not a concern of the Roman legal system because the con-
ditional sale, o sale on credit, was unknown to the Romans." In
fact, the modem civil law jurisdictions whose codes are based upon
Roman law came to accept the validity of the conditional sale only as
a result of judicial interpretation within the last 100 years.3
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF-HELP
REMEDY AND CHATTEL SECURITY DEVICES
IN ENGLISH COMMON LAW
A. THm HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-HELP AS A
GENERAL CONCEPT IN ENGLAND
During the major portion of its history, the English common law
took an extremely restrictive view toward any remedy involving self-
30. H. HERMAN, TREATIS ON CHATTEL MORTGAGES 479-80 (1877).
31. BUcKLAND & McNAiR, supra note 24, at 314.
32. BUCKLAND, supra note 23, at 353.
33. BucKLAND & McNAm, supra note 24, at 315, 323; BUcKLAND, supra note
23, at 354.
34. BucKLAND, supra note 23, at 353-54; BUCKL.AND & McNAm, supra note 24,
at 316-17.
35. O'Neal & Cruz, The Validity of the Conditional Sale in Civil Law, 4 TuL.
L. Rlv. 531, 533 (1930).
36. Id. at 565-69. The article notes that the Supreme Court of France ac-
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help.87 Violent or aggressive self-help which resulted in a breach
of the peace was regarded as contempt of the King, and informal self-
help was stringently prohibited until at least the end of the 13th cen-
tury.8   As stated by Pollock and Maitland:
Had we to write legal history out of our own heads, we might
plausibly suppose that in the beginning law expects men to
help themselves when they have been wronged, and that by
slow degrees it substitutes a litigatory procedure for the rude jus-
tice of revenge. There would be substantial truth in this theory.
For a long time law was very weak, and as a matter of fact it could
not prevent self help of the most violent kind. Nevertheless, at a
fairly early stage in its history it begins to prohibit in uncompro-
mising terms any and every attempt to substitute force for judg-
ment. Perhaps we can say that in its strife against violence it
keeps up its courage by bold words. It would prohibit utterly
what it cannot regulate.
This at all events was true of our Engiish law in the Thir-
teenth Century.8 9
As a general matter the right of self-redress became increasingly
regarded with favor by the English common law judges during the
14th, 15th and 16th centuries.40 By the last quarter of the 18th
century, at least one judge is reported to have regarded any exercise
of self-help in the retaking of chattels by their rightful owner as law-
ful so long as the method of recapture did not involve a felony.41
With the passage of another century self-help generally (and the
recapture of chattels absent a security device specifically) had be-
come accepted. One commentator, after reviewing the change in
the attitude of common law courts from hostility to benevolence, stated
the following theory for this evolution:
When recaption finally made its appearance in the course of the
Nineteenth Century, it did so released from all the restrictions of
cepted the validity of the conditional sale in 1895 for the first time and the high courts
of Spain and Italy reached similar conclusions by decisions in the years 1894 and
1912 respectively.
37. Branston, The Forcible Recaption of Chattels, 28 L.Q. REV. 262, 264-67
(1912) [hereinafter cited as Branston].
38. F. POLLOCK & F. MArTLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 52-53, 169 (2d
ed. 1923) [hereinafter cited as POLLOCK & MAIrLAND].
39. Id. at 574.
40. Branston, supra note 37, at 266.
41. See Goodhart v. Lowe, 37 Eng. Rep. 661, 662 (Ch. 1820); Branston, supra
note 37, at 274.
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former times, and it is suggested that just as the curtailment of the
right was rendered necessary in earlier times by the inability of the
law to regulate extra-judicial remedies, so the release of the right
from all these limitations in the Nineteenth Century was due to
the reliance which it was felt could be placed in modern times on
the legal machinery of our courts and the power of the executive
as represented by the police, to whom the maintenance of the pub-
lic peace might safely be entrusted. 42
Throughout the period from the 13th to the 19th centuries the com-
mon law increasingly allowed self-help in certain limited contexts
in which its use would not produce an injustice to the parties or a law-
less breach of the peace.4" The present tolerance of self-help reme-
dies by the courts of England would have surprised a jurist of 200
years ago. However, this modem English judicial attitude toward quiet
self-help is possible because the English legal system ". . . can safely
allow this [quiet self help] for it has mastered the sort of self help that
is lawless." 44
B. REPOSSESSION AND THE ENGLISH BILL OF SALE
During the medieval period the possessory pledge was virtually the
only personal property security device that was considered legally
valid, since the Roman concept of hypotheca, which involved a divi-
sion of the concepts of possession and ownership, had been rejected
by English courts as foreign to the common law tradition.45 How-
ever, the report in Twyne's Case46 illustrated that, by the late 16th
century, Englishmen were attempting to transfer the title to collateral
to a creditor as security while the debtor retained possession and use
of the chattel. The court in that case held that a transfer of owner-
42. Branston, supra note 37, at 275.
43. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 1490 n.2 (Jones ed. 1916); POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 38, at 574; cf. T. HOLLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE
323-25 (13th ed. 1924) [hereinafter cited as HOLLAND].
44. POLLOCK & MArrLAND, supra note 38, at 574.
45. Cf. Ryall v. Rowles, 27 Eng. Rep. 1074, 1080 (Ch. 1749), in which Judge
Burnet indicates that
the Roman hypotheca and an English mortgage are not of the same nature,
for an hypotheca gave only a lien and no property . . .a mortgage with us
is an immediate conveyance with power to redeem and gives a legal property.
All that can be argued from the Roman law with regard to pawns will be for-
eign to the question for delivery is of the essence of an English pawn.
See also Donald v. Suckling, [1866] L.R. 1 Q.B. 585, 613, wherein Judge Blackburn
states: "Mr]he right of hypothec is not recognized by the common law. Till posses-
sion is given the intended pledgee has only a right of action on the contract, and no
interest in the thing itself....."
46. 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601).
HeinOnline -- 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 68 1973-1974
THE RIGHT TO REPOSSESS
ship for security purposes without a transfer of possession was a
secret transfer and as such ". . always a badge of fraud ....
[B]y reason of [the debtor's continued possession] he traded and
trafficed with others and defrauded and deceived them."'4 7  Convey-
ances of property without a change in possession were thus rendered
invalid against unknowing third parties due to the effect of the Statute
of Frauds of 1571.48 Consistent with this view, a 1749 Chancery
Court bankruptcy decision established that a chattel mortgagee who
allowed the debtor to remain in possession of the chattel security
thereby lost any special claim to the security upon the debtor mort-
gagor's bankruptcy.49
Even with the restrictive view taken by the English courts toward
nonpossessory security interests, the bill of sale device, in which own-
ership but not possession of collateral was transferred from debtor
to creditor upon the condition that the "sale" or transfer would be void
upon repayment of the debt, eventually became the most common
form of personal property security device.50 However, the problems
caused by Twyne's Case and the 1749 bankruptcy law decision were
not cured until the passage of the recording statutes of the 19th century
under which the chattel mortgagee's ownership could be recorded,
thereby becoming "notorious" and superior to the claims of all sub-
sequent creditors or trustees in bankruptcy. 5'
As between the debtor and creditor, the bill of sale, which is
strikingly similar to the contemporary chattel mortgage, or, in its
practical effects, to the Greek and Roman hypothec, customarily in-
cluded a clause providing that, upon default by the grantor (mortga-
gor) in the payment of the secured indebtedness, the grantee (mort-
gagee) could enter the grantor's premises, take possession of the prop-
erty, and sell or dispose of it by public auction or private sale.5" Such
a clause within a bill of sale was construed as a license, allowing the
grantee to seize possession of the collateral upon default by the
grantor.
53
47. Id. at 812-13.
48. Act of Elizabeth Stat., 13 Eliz. 1, c.5 (1570).
49. Ryall v. Rowles, 27 Eng. Rep. 1074 (Ch. 1749).
50. HOLLAND, supra note 43, at 238; 5 ENGLISH RULING CASES, BILL Or SALE
1 (1902).
51. Glenn, The Chattel Mortgage As A Statutory Security, 25 VA. L. REv. 316,
324-29 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Glenn].
52. J. BEAUMONT, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BLLS OF SALE AND BLLS OF SALE
or Snis ch. 5, § 41, at 29 (1860) [hereinafter cited as BEAUMONT].
53. See Maughan v. Sharpe, 144 Eng. Rep. 179 (C.P. 1864); Simpson v. Wood,
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In commenting on the effect and wisdom of a properly drafted re-
possession upon default clause in a bill of sale, one mid-19th cen-
tury commentator stated as follows:
Should they who are in possession of the goods comprised in the
security refuse to allow the donnee to take the same [upon de-
fault] and he cannot do so without committing a breach of the
peace, or using force or terror, and his bill of sale is not so pre-
pared as to justify the breaking into the premises where his prop-
erty may be, he [the donnee] must await the issue of legal pro-
ceedings by action of detinue or trover against those who retain
possession, against him, but if the security be properly prepared,
the donnee will be able to plea successfully "leave and license"
to any action of trespass that may be brought against him by the
donor of the bill of sale, by reason of any force or violence to
which it may have been found necessary to resort to enable him to
obtain possession of his property."4
Since the grantor (mortgagor) under the bill of sale granted "title"
to the collateral to the grantee (mortgagee), there is late 19th century
authority for giving the latter freedom to take possession on failure of
the condition of payment and to sell the collateral to satisfy the debt
without the necessity of a specific clause establishing such rights in the
bill of sale. 5
The repossession and sale rights of a holder of a bill of sale were
subject to an equity of redemption in favor of the grantor (mortgagor)
which was terminable by noticed sale of the property by the creditor,
or by judicial foreclosure or lapse of time.5 A series of three Bills of
Sale Acts in the 19th century made a security interest created by that
device unchallengeable by subsequent creditors if the bill was re-
corded in the statutorily prescribed manner.57  The last of these was
155 Eng. Rep. 982 (Ex. 1852); Martindale v. Booth, 110 Eng. Rep. 180 (K.B. 1832);
3 THE AmucAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAw § 7, at 204 (Merrill ed.
1887); C. CAVANAGH, THE LAw OF MONEY SEcURITIES 227 (2d ed. 1885); 38 HALS-
BURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, TRESPASS § 1247, at 758 (3d ed. 1962); F. POLLOcK, AN
ESSAY ON POSSESSION IN THE COMMON LAw ch. 2, § 9, at 77 (1888); H. REED, THE
BILS OF SALES AcTS 123 et seq. (14th ed. 1926).
54. BEAUMONT, supra note 52, ch. 14, § 123, at 72.
55. Johnson v. Diprose, [1893] 1 Q.B. 512, 516, 517; Gilmore & Axelrod, Chattel
Security I, 57 YALE L.J. 518, 532 n.30 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Gilmore & Axelrod];
Glenn, supra note 51, at 316, 330-32.
56. 3 THE AMmuCAN AND ENGLISH ENCyCLOPEDiA OF LAW § 18, at 205 (1887);
Chaplin, The Story of Mortgage Law, 4 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1890).
57. C. VAINES, PERSONAL PROPERTY 402 (4th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as
VAINESI.
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the Bills of Sale Act of 1882 which amended the Act of 1878 and pre-
scribed a standard form for such bills, limited the permissible causes for
repossession of the collateral by the creditor, and provided that a cred-
itor could not carry away the collateral until five days after seizure. 58
C. REPOSSESSION AND THE ENGLISH CONDITIONAL SALE CONTRACT
Following Lord Mansfield's decision in the 1779 case of Boone v.
Eyre, 9 which established the basis for distinguishing immaterial
covenants from material conditions in a contract, the English law
of conditional sale contracts was placed on a firm foundation. English
courts proceeded ovei the next half century to develop the broad
themes of conditional sales law. The seller, who retained title dur-
ing the payment period, could retake possession upon breach of the
condition of the buyer's timely payment. At the same time, the seller
could not sue for a deficiency judgment and the buyer was denied any
equity of redemption.60
For reasons relating to the validity of the vendor's interest in a
conditional sale contract against third party creditors of the buyer, the
transaction was often cast in the form of a "hire-purchase" agree-
ment."' Under the terms of such an agreement, the owner leased
the goods to the buyer on hire and agreed that the hirer could either re-
turn the goods and terminate the hiring or elect to purchase the goods
when the payments had reached a sum equal to the purchase price
stated in the agreement.62 As in the case of the usual conditional sale
contract, the hire-purchase agreement provided the title retaining
owner-lessor with the right to take possession of the goods upon the
default of the hirer, this right of self-help being recognized at common
law.63 Recent legislation designed to curb abuses associated with the
use of hire-purchase contracts has limited the otherwise freely exercised
58. Bills of Sale Act of 1878, Amendment Act of 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., ch. 43,
§ 7; Manchester Sheffield & Lincolnshire Ry. v. North Central Wagon Co., 13 App.
Cas. 554, 560 (1888). See generally Willis, Observations on the Workings on the
Bills of Sale Act 1878, Amendment Act 1882, 3 L.Q. Rnv. 300 (1887).
59. Boone v. Eyre, 126 Eng. Rep. 160 (1779); see the discussion of that case
and Lord Mansfield's work at 1 G. GILMORE, SEcuRrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY 64-66 (1965) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE].
60. See generally GLMoE, supra note 59, at 66-68.
61. See J. MAcLEoD, SALE AND HIn-PuRcHASE 329 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
MAcLEoD]; VAYNm, supra note 57, at 345-46.
62. Cf. 2 CBrr ON CONTRACTS 410-12 (23rd ed. 1968).
63. A. GuEsT, THE LAW OF HnE-PuRCHASE 219, 221-22 (1966); 19 HALSBURY'S
LAws OF ENGLAND, HUE-PURCHASE § 882, at 545-46 (3d ed. 1957); MACL.EoD, supra
note 61, at 330; Green, The Law of Hire-Purchase, 19 L. STUDENTS J. 187 (1896).
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right of repossession by prohibiting the owner-lessor from repossessing
without first obtaining a court order if one-third or more of the total
hire-purchase contract price has been paid by the hirer. 64
III. THE RIGHT TO REPOSSESS IN THE LAW OF
CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL
SALES CONTRACTS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. COMMON LAW DEVELOPMENT
Both the bill of sale or chattel mortgage and the conditional sale con-
tract were used extensively at an early date in the United States. 0 Dur-
ing the 19th century, the courts in most states viewed chattel mort-
gages in the same fashion as English common law judges regarded bills
of sale; accordingly, it was held that the mortgage passed legal title to
the collateral to the mortgagee, subject to divestment upon repay-
ment of the underlying obligation.66 This majority view is illustrated
by the 1869 New York decision of Stoddard v. Dennison,6r where the
court stated:
A mortgage of personal chattels is a sale on condition. The legal
title to the chattel is vested in the mortgagee, subject to the right
of the mortgagor to perform the conditions. Upon default there
is no doubt of the mortgagor's right to perform, and upon perfor-
mance to reinvest himself with the legal title ....
The respective rights and interests of the parties, therefore,
are-the legal title is vested in the mortgagee, subject to an ab-
solute right of redemption upon performance of the condition;
upon breach of the condition the legal title becomes absolute in
the mortgagee, leaving a mere equity in the mortgagor.6 8
A minority of states adopted the "lien theory" of chattel mortgages,
under which the execution of the chattel mortgage did not pass title,
but merely conveyed a lien as security for payment of the indebted-
64. Hire-Purchase Act 1965, §§ 33-34. See discussion of the same provisions
in the 1938 Hire-Purchase Act in Chorley, The Hire Purchase Bill, 2 MODERN L. REv.
51, 52 (1938).
65. Grant Gilmore states that chattel mortgages in the United States were ex-
clusively statutory devices which were validated as early as 1820 in the eastern sea-
board states. 1 GiLMORE, supra note 59, at 26. The United States Supreme Court in
Harkness v. Russell, 118 U.S. 663 (1886), recognized the validity of conditional
sales and traced their use in the United States as early as 1808.
66. L. JONES, CHA'rL MORTGAGES 1-2 (5th ed. 1908) [hereinafter cited as
CHATTEL MORTGAGES].
67. 38 N.Y. Pr. Rptr. (How. Pr.) 296 (1869).
68. Id. at 296, 301-02.
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ness to the moitgagee.69 As was the case at English common law,
the seller under a conditional sale contract was considered the holder
of the title to the goods. 70
American courts, by the great weight of authority, held that the
right of self-help repossession of the collateral upon default was
valid when provided for in either the mortgage or the contract of sale.
Regarding repossession and chattel mortgages, Judge Leonard A. Jones,
a leading commentator during the late 19th century, stated:
Upon default the mortgagee is entitled to take a peaceable posses-
sion, without a prior demand for the payment of the debt ....
A provision in the mortgage, that the mortgagee upon default
may take possession of the property and sell it, creates an im-
plied contract that he may enter the place where the property is
kept and take the same. 71
This right to take possession upon default by the mortgagor was ex-
ercisable by the mortgagee regardless of whether the state was a
"lien theory" or a "title theory" jurisdiction."
Similarly, the right of a seller under a conditional sale contract
to repossess the item sold was clearly established by the courts of this
country. 73 As stated by Judge Jones:
If the contract gives the vendor the privilege amounting to a li-
cense to enter upon premises for the purpose of removing the goods
when default in payment has occurred, such license is generally
considered as irrevocable, and the vendee has no legal right to
change his mind when the time for recapture comes. When such
a license has been given it is the prevalent judicial view that in ex-
69. 1 L. JONES, THE LAW OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES
§ 1 (6th ed. 1933) [hereinafter cited as L. JONES].
70. Id. at 9H 1337-39; VOLD ON SALES 286-88 (1941).
71. 2 L. JONES, supra note 69, § 705, at 464. This edition restates the earlier
conclusion of the author found in L. JONES, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF MORTGAGES
OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 705 (1881). To the same effect, see 1 J. COBBEY, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES § 482 (1893). An
extensive note on the subject which cites a wealth of authority, primarily from 19th
century cases in many states, is found in Right of Chattel Mortgagee To Take Pos-
session of Property Without Legal Process, Annot., 57 A.L.R. 26 (1928).
72. CHATTEL MORTGAGES, supra note 66, at 888-91, 900-01.
73. A large number of early cases establishing this point are collected and set
forth in Right of Conditional Seller To Retake Property Without Judicial Aid, Annot.,
55 A.L.R. 184 (1928). See case collected at 2A UNiFORm LAWS ANNOTATED, COm-
MENTARIES ON CONDmONAL SALES ch. 11, § 109, at 150 (1924) [hereinafter cited as
UNiFORM LAws].
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ercising it the vendor may use such force as may be necessary to
accomplish the purpose intended by the contract-the removal of
the goods. 74
As might be expected, several courts did not take as sanguine a view as
Judge Jones of repossessions which involved breach of the peace or
violence. 7  However, courts generally allowed the seller to exer-
cise the remedy of self-help iepossession even without an express pro-
vision in the contract authorizing the right, on the basis of the intrinsic
nature of a conditional sale contract in which the seller retains title,
and, by implication, the right to repossess. 7' The widely adopted
Uniform Conditional Sales Act, first proposed in 1918, gave the condi-
tional seller the statutory right to repossess upon a default in payment
of in the performance of any other material condition without prior
agreement of the parties if the repossession could be accomplished
without breaching the peace. 77
The legislatures and courts in this country during the first half
of the 20th century often acted to narrow the legal distinctions and
practical differences between chattel mortgages and conditional sale
contracts. 78  As early as 1918 the drafters of the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act had seriously considered, but ultimately rejected, the sugges-
tion that the conditional sale contract be equated with the chattel
mortgage in all material respects, including establishing a right on be-
half of the conditional buyer to an equity of redemption and eliminat-
ing the doctrine of "election of remedies" as applied to the conditional
seller.79  The distinction between chattel mortgages and conditional
sales was seen as artificial by many jurists during the period, including
Learned Hand, who stated that the distinction was "wholly barren,"
74. 3 L. JONES, supra note 69, § 1339, at 426.
75. See, e.g., McCarty-Greene Motor Co. v. House, 216 Ala. 666, 114 So. 60
(1927); Abel v. M.H. Pickering Co., 58 Pa. Super. 429 (1914).
76. See generally L. JoNES, supra note 69, § 1337, at 421 (6th ed. 1933); 2A
UNiFoRm LAws, supra note 73, ch. 11, § 102, at 140.
77. See UNiFORM CoNDrroNAL SALs Acr § 16. The Uniform Act was adopted
in 12 states including the important commercial jurisdictions of New York and Penn-
sylvania during the period from 1919 through 1943. In 1943 the Act was withdrawn
from the list of Uniform Acts recommended by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws for adoption by the states. This action was taken be-
cause of the participation by the Conference in the drafting of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.
78. Glenn, The Conditional Sale at Common Law and as a Statutory Security,
25 VA. L. Rav. 559, 578 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Conditional Sale]; Gilmore &
Axelrod, supra note 55, at 542-43.
79. Conditional Sale, supra note 78, at 578-79; Codifying the Law of Condi-
tional Sales, 18 COLUM. L. Rnv. 103, 107 (1918).
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being based upon a purely conceptual notion of "title," as to which:
"I do not know what it [the concept of "title"] means and I question
whether anybody does, except perhaps legal historians."80
B. THE UNIFoRm COMMERCIAL CODE
The most significant event in the development of commercial law in
this country during the 20th century was the promulgation and sub-
sequent adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code."1 The study and
drafting which produced the UCC commenced in 1942 and continued
for 10 years, culminating with the Official Draft of 1952. First
adopted in Pennsylvania in 1952, the UCC is now the governing stat-
ute concerning the buying and selling of goods in the District of Col-
umbia and every state except Louisiana. 2
While most of the UCC merely restated existing law, Article 9 of
the Code dramatically changed the traditional law of personal prop-
erty security in the United States. Speaking in general terms, the
UCC's Chief Reporter, Professor Karl N. Llewellyn, stated that the
drafters of Article 9 sought to change the law of personal property se-
curity in order to establish greater clarity, simplicity, convenience,
fairness, completeness, accessibility, and uniformity. 3 Whether the
draftes of Article 9 succeeded in attaining these lofty goals or in es-
tablishing an improved law for personal property security was a mat-
ter of some debate during the drafting of the UCC; however, all com-
mentators generally agree that Article 9 made more sweeping changes
in the law which it codified than any of the other eight Articles of
the Code.84
The state of the law of personal property security immediately
prior to the drafting of the UCC was, to say the least, variegated. A
welter of statutes and common law doctrines controlled the rights and
80. In re Lake's Laundry, Inc., 79 F.2d 326, 328-39 (2d Cir. 1935) (L. Hand,
J., dissenting).
81. The UCC was a project jointly sponsored by the American Law Institute
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
82. Preface to R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIoFM COMMERCIAL CODE
at iv (1970).
83. Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB.
687 (1948).
84. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted,
61 YALE L.. 334, 354-55 (1952); Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the
Commercial Code, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 27, 28 (1951) [hereinafter cited as
Secured Transactions]; Kripke, The Modernization of Commercial Security Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAw & CoNTEM. OB. 182 (1951).
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duties of parties who entered into personal property security transac-
tions by signing various types of security devices, including chattel
mortgages and traditional sales contracts.85  The central idea of the
drafters of Article 9 was to abolish the legal significance which pre-
viously attached to the different technical forms of security devices.
Thus the Article establishes that the same legal results will follow re-
gardless of the form of security device involved and substitutes a uni-
form terminology to be used by the courts in dealing with personal
property security transaction problems.8 6 These principal features of
Article 9 are demonstrated in sections 9-503 and 9-504, which speak of
self-help seizure of property without differentiating between the con-
ditional seller who extends credit and, if unpaid, "repossesses" the
item which he has sold, and the lender who takes a chattel mortgage
upon certain items of personal property held by the borrower. This
is reminiscent of the Greeks and Romans, who, like the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, made no distinction between a credit sale or
a loan of money as far as the rights of the security interest holder
were concerned.
The statutory right of the secured party to repossess and sell the
collateral upon default without a court hearing was a feature of the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act, as noted previously.87  The advisa-
85. Secured Transactions, supra note 84, at 29-34. For an elaborate and de-
tailed review of the various security devices and controlling law in the field at the time,
see Gilmore & Axelrod, supra note 55, at 517.
86. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 9-101, Comment. Judicial recognition
of this principle is illustrated by the following statement from United Thrift Stores,
Inc., 363 F.2d 11, 14 (3d Cir. 1966):
The [Uniform Commercial] Code has eliminated the older, technical and
restricted categories of security agreements. Gone are the definitional diffi-
culties and transactional fictions of the chattel-mortgage, the conditional
sale, the trust receipt. In their stead is a general set of rules for the crea-
tion of a security interest in a secured party.
Although Article 9 was rewritten numerous times prior to the adoption of the
Official Text in 1952, the basic idea providing for unitary legal treatment of all se-
curity devices remained constant, and only one major structural change was made in
the Article from original draft to Official Text. See Secured Transactions, supra
note 84, at 33-34. This structural change was made after the publication of the May,
1949 draft of the UCC. In that draft the Article governing secured transactions
(Article 7) was divided into eight Parts, five of which dealt with specific forms of
collateral, i.e., inventory, consumer goods, and so forth. The next draft of the UCC
in 1950 changed the number of the secured transactions Article from 7 to 9 and re-
structured the component Parts of the Article along functional lines, eliminating the
division of Parts on the basis of the type of collateral involved. The structure of the
proposed final draft of Article 9 remained unchanged in the Official Draft which was
promulgated in 1952.
87. See note 77 supra.
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bility of establishing a right of self-help repossession for all secured
parties, regardless of the form of the security device involved, was
unanimously accepted by all members and advisors of the drafting
staff of Article 9, prior to the promulgation of the 1949 Draft.8 8 That
Draft reflects this basic agreement on the validity of unhampered self-
help repossession, at least in those transactions involving business-
men."' However, the 1949 Draft also contained provisions requiring
a secured party to give 20 days' notice by a prescribed form of written
statement before repossessing if the collateral was a consumer good
and the consumer-debtor had paid more than 60 percent of the pur-
chase price or loan.90 This requirement for a repossession of con-
sumer goods was deleted from Article 9 in the 1950 Draft and the Of-
ficial Draft of 1952. In this respect Article 9 may be viewed as a strik-
ing return to the almost unrestricted right of self-help repossession
which existed in Greek and Roman law and in English common law
during the 18th and 19th centuries. Formal statutory requirements
for the enforcement of security agreements were to a large extent aban-
doned in the Article,91 with the lender being given a great deal of
freedom in disposing of the collateral after default.92
The decision of the drafters to delete the requirement of a strict
procedure upon default in consumer goods transactions was one as-
pect of a general determination made by them to abstain from attempt-
ing a reformist codification in Article 9 of the law governing the sale
88. Gilmore, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code-Part Y (Default), 7
CONFERENCE ON PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP. 4, 7 (1952).
89. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-323 (May, 1949 Draft) (inventory as
collateral), § 7-413 (business equipment as collateral), and § 7-515 (farm products
as collateral).
90. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 7-605, 7-606 (May, 1949 Draft).
91. Affidavits of good faith, notarization, verification, and other execution re-
quirements, as well as specific descriptions of collateral, are no longer required. See
Secured Transactions, supra note 84, at 35.
92. inhere is in Article 9 no requirement of sale at public auction follow-
ing public notice; no requirement that repossessed collateral be held for a
specif ed period before disposition or that collateral be disposed of within a
specified period after repossession; no requirement even that the collateral be
repossessed, since it is provided that a lender may deal with and dispose of it
on the debtor's premises. In place of all these protective devices, designed to
block the real and present danger of fraud or overreaching, there is erected
only the flimsiest of safeguards: the lender, in dealing with the collateral,
must observe a standard called "commercial reasonableness," an undefined
term of no known legal meaning.
Secured Transactions, supra note 84, at 35-36. Gilmore nonetheless defends UCC §§ 9-
503 and 9-504 on the theory that the prior restrictions did not deter fraud and made it
impossible to dispose of collateral at a decent price. The standard of "commercial
reasonableness" deliberately leaves to the courts the issue of the fairness of the credi-
tor's disposition of collateral. Id.
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of consumer goods. This major policy decision was made for two
r asons. First, the drafters came to believe that effective regulation
of consumer credit sales could be obtained only by the establishment
of state administrative agencies and this was felt to be beyond the
authority of the promulgators of the UCC. Second, the drafters were
eventually persuaded that a worthwhile reform of abusive practices
in the field required the enactment of a code covering all consumer
credit transactions, and not just those transactions involving secu-
rity interests.93
Almost 20 years later, in 1968, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform CQnsumer
Credit Code (UCCC), which regulates all consumer loans and credit
sales and provides for administrative enforcement and implemen-
tation. Interestingly, in light of the histoly previously mentioned, the
UCCC contains no provisions which regulate the right of a secured
creditor of a consumer to repossess upon default. However, the ad-
ministrator established by the statute is given the power to bring
a civil action to restrain a creditor of a consumer from engaging in
fraudulent or unconscionable conduct in the collection of debt."4 Ex-
cept for possible action by the administrator under this section, the
repossession rights of the creditor of a consumer are expressly unaf-
fected by the UCCC and are to be governed by sections 9-503 and 9-
504 of the Uniform Commercial Code.95
In the 1950 Draft of the UCC the default remedy sections of
Article 9 were drafted in a way which would be carried forward sub-
stantially unchanged in the 1952 Official Draft. Section 9-503 codi-
fied the judicially established rule that a secured party could take pos-
session of collateral upon default without legal process if this could be
done without breaching the peace. As has been noted, this basic right
of self-help repossession had been expressed in similar language in the
earlier Uniform Conditional Sales Act and in the more specialized 1933
Uniform Trust Receipts Act.9"
In drafting section 9-504, which governs the rights and duties of
the repossessing secured party in realizing on the collateral by fore-
closure sale, the drafters opted to follow the liberalized procedure of
93. Secured Transactions, supra note 84, at 45.
94. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDrr CODE § 8.111(1) (c).
95. See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, § 5.103, Comment 1.
96. 2 U.L.A. CONDrrIONAL SALES 27-28 (1922) (UNIFoRM CONDrnONAL SALES
ACr § 16); 9A U.L.A. Misc. AcTS 297-98 (1951) (UNIFORM TRUsT RECEIPTS AcT
§ 6).
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the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, rather than the highly structured re-
quirements of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act.9 7  Section 6 of the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act provided that a repossessing secured party
could, after five days' written notice, sell the collateral at either a pub-
lic or private sale with the right to claim a deficiency against the
debtor or, correspondingly, the duty to account to the debtor for any
surplus.9 8
On the other hand, the Uniform Conditional Sales Act required that
an elaborate and precise public sale procedure be followed by a fore-
closing secured party when 50 percent of the sales price had been
paid by the debtor.9 9 A mandatory 10-day redemption period was re-
quired by the Act unless the secured party had served a notice of in-
tention to repossess not more than 40 nor less than 20 days prior to the
physical repossession. 00 UCC section 9-507 establishes the right of a
secured party to ". . . sell, lease or othefwise dispose . . ." of the
collateral in any "commercially reasonable" manner with the secured
party being required to give "reasonable notification" of the time and
place of the public or private sale or other intended disposition. 110  The
debtor's right to redeem continues until a secured party sells or dis-
poses of the collateral, and the secured party is required to sell or dis-
pose of the collateral only when it is a consumer good in which the
secured party had a purchase money security interest.'
0 2
The decision of the drafters to accord great freedom to a repos-
sessing secured party in section 9-504 was based on the strong belief
that foreclosure sales under that section would henceforth generally
be made through private or regular commercial channels which would
make it more likely that the collateral would be sold for fair market
value than was the case at restricted public sales under the Uniform Con-
ditional Sales Act provisions."' Thus the drafters felt that the debtor
97. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504, Comment 1 (Proposed Final Draft,
Spring 1950). The substance of this Comment remains the same in all subsequent
drafts of the UCC.
98. 9A U.L.A. Misc. AcT 297 (1951).
99. 2 U.L.A. CONDrnoNAL StALs 30-31 (1922) (UNIFORM CONDmONAL SAtns
Acr § 19).
100. 2 U.L.A. CONDrrONAL SALEs 28-29 (1922) (UNIFORM CoNDrIONAL SALs
AcT, §§ 17-18).
101. UNIFORM COMMmRCuL CODE § 9-504.
102. Id. § 9-505.
103. See Gilmore, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code-Part V (Default),
7 Conference on Personal Finance L.Q. Rep. 4, 7, 8, 11 (1952). Professor Gilmore
was, together with Professor Allison Dunham, one of the joint reporters for Article 9 of
the UCC. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 597 (May, 1949 version). Professor Gil-
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would ultimately benefit from these liberalized provisions in what they
viewed as the vast majority of situations where the secured party is act-
ing in good faith. For those instances of bad faith, which the drafters
felt would be rare, resort by the debtor to court relief under section
9-507 is authorized when the secured party is not acting in a "com-
mercially reasonable" manner.
IV. THE REMEDY OF SELF-HELP
REPOSSESSION IN CALIFORNIA
The history of the repossession remedy in California does not vary
in any significant detail from that in the United States generally. In
adopting the English common law as legal precedent in 1850, California
also adopted the common law title theory of chattel mortgages. 04  In
1872, the California Legislature adopted the lien theory of chattel
mortgages and curtailed the right of the mortgagee to seize possession
of the property unless a specific right to do so was given in the mort-
gage.10 5
With regard to conditional sale contracts, California courts histor-
ically took the view that, since the seller retained title until the con-
ditions were satisfied, he was entitled to repossess upon default in pay-
ment, even without express provision in the contract.100 In exer-
cising the right to repossess the seller was permitted to use force so
long as the repossession could be accomplished without assaulting or
injuring the buyer or breaching the peace.1 7 The seller was required
more has credited Professors Karl Llewellyn and Soia Mentschikoff as being additional
members of the drafting staff of Article 9 in one of his many lucid publications on the
subject of personal property security law. Secured Transactions, supra note 84, at 27.
104. On the general adoption of the common law of England in California see
Comm. on the Judiciary, Report on Civil and Common Law, 1 Cal. 588, 600-01 (1850)
and An Act Adopting the Common Law, ch. XL 186 [1850] Cal. Stat. which reads:
The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent
with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of the
State of California, shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this state.
On the establishment of the common law title theory of chattel mortgages in this state,
see Heyland v. Badger, 35 Cal. 404 (1868); Wilson v. Brannan, 27 Cal. 258 (1865).
105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2957 (1872) which read as follows:
A mortgage does not entitle the mortgagee to the possession of the property,
unless authorized by the express terms of the mortgage; but after the execu-
tion of the mortgage, the mortgagor may agree to such change of possession
without a new consideration.
106. See numerous California cases mentioned in Hines, Rights and Remedies
Under California Conditional Sales, 23 CALIF. L. REv. 557, 571-72, 578, 582 (1935)
[hereinafter cited as Hines].
107. Siverstin v. Kohler & Chase, 181 Cal. 51, 54 (1919); Hines, supra note 106,
at 578.
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to elect remedies upon default in payment, unless the conditional
sale contract allowed him to repossess the property, sell it at a fore-
closure sale, and sue for a deficiency judgment. 08 Upon adoption of
the UCC in 1965, the legal distinctions between conditional sale con-
tracts and chattel mortgages were eliminated in California, and the
rights and duties of the holder of the security interest who would seek
to repossess were established by sections 9-503 and 9-504.
V. CONCLUSION
The right to repossess upon default has been available to holders of
a security interest in collateral either by statute, common law, or agree-
ment of the parties in the United States virtually since the beginnings of
the republic. In England, with a more extensive legal history, the
remedy has been well established for several hundred years. The
Greeks and Romans recognized the remedy during antiquity. How
this right will fare when scrutinized by the United States Supreme Court
for compliance with the dictates of the due process clause remains to
be seen. If the short shrift which that Court gave to the right of pre-
judgment attachment with its similar historical lineage is an indica-
tion, the days of the free and widespread exercise of a secured credi-
tor's right to repossess upon default may well be approaching an end.
108. Johnson v. Kaeser, 196 Cal. 686, 694 (1925); General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Brown, 2 Cal. App. 2d 646, 649 (1934).
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